Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford Political Theory)

Traditionally, republicanism has focused on the rights of civic-minded, virtuous, and independent elites to be free from the tyranny of emperors, kings, and the like. Those economically dependent on others (and most are) were not suitable candidates for the enjoyment of republican freedom. The Jeffersonian era is often described as republican because of a large base of independent farmers. Republicanism does not actually imply a precise form of government. A benign monarch can be seen as honoring republican ideas as much as a democratically elected government. At least historically, republicanism does seem to imply limited government with a large civic sphere. But public life in the modern era exists in a truncated form. The author scarcely discusses the isolation and privatization of modern life. It cannot be ignored that the rise of huge corporations has walled off more and more of society's daily actions from public view and control.

The author eschews the liberal idea that republican freedom consists mostly of the lack of interference from those powerfully situated. Instead, he emphasizes the lack of domination, even the potential for domination, as the key element of republicanism. The possibility, regardless of how remote, of arbitrary interference undermines the full development of republican freedom. Such a possibility requires that defensive strategies be employed to avoid the powerful or to curry favor with them. In addition, in the author's conception of republicanism, all of society should be free from even a chance of capricious domination.

This level of republican freedom requires both the rule of law backed by a strong state and a presence in such private institutions as the family and corporations. Republicanism, either in the ancient or in the author's version, is not a theory of participatory democracy. Yet republicanism requires an active and virtuous citizenry ever vigilant for the use of arbitrary power. For the author the power of democracy is in the ability to contest actions and not in the construction of citizen friendly laws and customs. Why citizen empowerment on the front end is problematical but is necessary on the back end is bound to be puzzling to many readers. Is the citizenry virtuous and capable or not?

As other reviewers have noted, the book is exceedingly repetitious with endless, minute distinctions being made between republican freedom and freedom as non-interference. The author never makes clear how a government of divided powers and a regime of law that is clearly self-constraining can penetrate the broader society, especially in the private realm, to establish republican freedom, or non-denomination. How can the author not be aware of, or at least not address, the immense power of corporations and institutions of the media and education to shape and direct the direction of government and all of our lives. The theory of republicanism, even in the expanded form voiced by the author, seems woefully inadequate for the comprehensive tyrannies of the modern era.


Beautiful ideas (in context) and some ancient Roman words   February 3, 2002
 6 out of 10 found this review helpful

This book is written for those who have studied or wish to study political philosophy in detail. And while you're studying philosophy and politics, brush up on your legal theory as well. You are going to need all three and more, to fully explore the ideas in this book.

The title 'Republicanism' is confusing. This is not a book about our current politcal parties or present republics. It is about creating political parties and using politcal ideas that are taken from ancient Rome, which was a 'republic'. Personally, I would have titled this book very differently, but that's just me. Mr Pettit can call his book whatever he wants. Because it's brilliant, would sell and would make people think even if it were titled 'This Book Stinks - and oh, by the way, we're watching you and we're sending crack assasins 'round to your house, if you even sniff in it's general direction'.

Pettit suggests not socialism, but cooperation between government and people. His ideas suggest we need more exchange of information between government and people. So yes, the people have to listen to government more, but he is not suggesting that government control the people or that people have to agree with what they are listening to.
And again, there is another term 'dominion' that is misleading if you only skim this book, or if you are not well studied in philosophy. The term 'dominion' does not mean lack of freedom in the context of this book. It means cooperation, but with the freedom to cooperate or not without suffering serious consequences if you don't.
Let me illustrate. Here in Australia (the author and I are from the same town) we are forced to either fill out a voting form, OR, send in a voting form in the mail. We ARE NOT forced to put anything sensible on that voting form. Therefore, we ARE NOT forced to vote.
What Pettit is suggesting here is to go one step further, where we would be forced to communicate with government, but we ARE NOT forced to agree with them or to communicate in any coherent way.
So, just like if we are forced to fill in a voting form, then more of us will actually make a sensible vote than if filling in a form is optional, if we are forced to communicate something with government we may well be more likely to communicate information that we would value government taking into consideration, and may be more likely to write to goverment in the future about issues we care about.
Now, again, me personally, would stear clear of using a confusing term like 'dominion' but thats just me.

If deep technical political philosophy is your bag, I think you will enjoy this book. If shallow current affairs type politics is your thing, you still may get something out of it but then again, you might be too shallow to appreciate this book.
Whoever you are, I urge you to read it anyway.
Highly recommended.

P.S. In Australia we are required to attend the polling place and put the form in the box, but we may leave it blank.
I think that that nuance, while important, might be uneccessarily complex to try and work into the above explanation. I leave it here as a footnote.


Tedious and Illusory   July 8, 2001
 7 out of 18 found this review helpful

This is an odd book that should not be confused with contemporary divisions between "democrats" and "republicans." The "republic" in the title concerns what the author sets out to establish as a long political tradition dating back to early Rome (of Cicero fame) up to the end of the eighteenth century. The author wants to resurrect the ideas of antique republicanism that he argues existed until the advent of classical and modern liberalism two centuries ago.

The book is bifurcated into a general theory that is extremely verbose, repetitious, and belabored. His tool is analytical philosophy, whereupon he takes each facet of antique republicanism and compares it to today's liberalism (classical and welfarist). I found this section could be easily skimmed without loss of the author's essential ideas and without becoming an albatross around the reader's neck. He claims that traditional republicanism held "dominion," not "Freedom" as the republican ideal. Pettit thinks we've chosen the latter over the former to our own detriment. The republican ideal is to escape all forms of domination by others, and imperium by the government, rather than the liberal ideal of escaping all interference by others.

The second section deals with how the republican ideal could ideally be implemented. This part of the book seems particularly cursory. To no surprise after a lengthy adumbration, socialism is the answer to the master/slave relationships built upon liberal ideals. Modern capitalism is too laden with employer dominion and other forms of enslavement that Petit thinks are the core reasons for today's whims and caprice of one's power over others. Only socialism removes the arbitrary whims of the owner/renter, management/laborer, and other forms of boss/servant. The goal here is to eliminate all forms of "arbitariness," which is a noble goal, and that makes man insecure and enslaved by that insecurity.

But Petit's prescription also calls for a major constitutional and social re-education in HIS form of government, with proper roles and division of powers, so that government itself doesn't move beyond mere domination on the individual toward imperium. He also extols the rule of law, which must be uniform and applicable to all (no special interest or special exemptions). Petit believes division of powers distributes power into too many hands and prevents government itself from becoming the great Dominion itself. He recognizes the tacit problem of bureaucracies in exercising its dominion over the "lesser man," but thinks altruism and mind control will ultimately win out in his utopian resolutions.

There are all sorts of problems with this exposition. Besides the early tedium and ubiquitous redundancies, the author fails to deal with the dominion of State bureaucracies, individual power plays even within democratic republics, and the servitude that can occur when the State is in control of most civil life. Hayek, who also is strongly opposed to arbitrariness as a social evil, does much better than Pettit in constructing a social reality that is free of government imperium. In fact, Pettit seems to ignore Hayek's contributions to this important concept, failing to address that whenever the government takes, it rarely returns. Pettit believes that everyone will be "educated" by government to be civil, and from their civility, develop a non-dominion society that is carefully managed to avoid it from becoming its own imperium. Tell that to the Soviet Socialist Republics.

There are some interesting ideas, not the least of which, is the republican ideal of avoiding insecurity and capriciousness. But it seems that Pettit's State wants to do the ubiquitous work of free peoples, such that it too easily will turn into the very extremes of interference and imperium that is repugnant to the very values he extols. It would be nice to eliminate insecurity and arbitrariness from social life, but at what cost? In Pettit's mind, a the loss of freedom in exchange for liberty is an "entitlement" that republicanism is all about (sound curious? It is.)